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No. 71-666
U.S. v . Glaxo Group Ltd.
Appeal from USDC DC: Gasch
This is a direct appeal from an anit-trust action.

The

govt brings the appeal under the expediting act.
XNN Two British companies, Galaxo and Imperial Chemical

Industries, Lta . txg~~xtx«i (ICI) owned a number of patents
relating to the maNNga« manufacture and use of gxi~ griseofulvin,
an antibotic drug .

w

xk~x~ax They agreed with each other to pool

; heir patf¼}s

an~(c,

in bulk form .

Accoridingly, ICI entered

prohibit licensees from selling griseDfulvin
R

into an agreement with

its licensee , American Home FxNNN«g Products Corpx and Galxo

•

entered into agreements with Schering Corp and XNRNXW Johnson &
Johnson ximix±Rgxxa x Rx authorizing manufacture of gx ±x Rf griseofulvin
but XRXKXX«XiRgxxxaxxaXRXXKX prohibiting sales in bulk .
In 1968 the govt filed suit charing ICI and Galaxo with

✓

•

-2violating §1 of the Sherman Act .

,

The complaint «N alleged that

the two comr:f\,1ies had combined to r e s # t sales of ix their
licensees.

The case was decided without trial on the discovery

that was taken.

The district court held that the restriction

against selling griseofulvini

in bulk form was a violation.
complained
The government also xxxe~XXNXameN~Xxkex~EM~XXXNXXXEXKNEW that
the griseofulvin patents owned by ICI and Glaxo were invalide.

But the two defendants stated that they were not relying on
the validity of the patents.

JkexgNXRXNMRNXXKNRXRX~XRXXMXRN

The court therefore ruled that the government had no standing
to challenge the patents, and it struck those allegations of
XNXX invalidity from the complaint.

Nor would the court permit

the government to ammend the complaint to show, aside from the

•

a n t i ~ t claim, that the patents were illegal.

The govt sought

a decree prohibiting any bul~ sale restrictions and requiring
compulsory sales Nf and licensing provisions.

The court refused

to grant the latter relief noting that the licensing conduct
was not bound up with the illegal RK restrictions on bulk sales.

-

On appeal, the govt contends that the disrict court erred
in not considering the validity of the patent and that it should
have required compulsory licensing.

In United States v. American

Bell Telephone, ~o., xx2xNxixxx~ix 167 U.S. 224 (1897), the Court
decided that the g ovt did not have standing to ~kx challenge the
validity of a patent excpet on grounds of fraud or deceit.

However ,

in U .S. V. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948), when

•

an anti-trust def raised a patent as a defnese, the govt was

I

permitted to show that the patent was invalid.

The govt claims

that Qypsum ~i«x has overruled Bell and that the public interest
in free competition should permit it to challenge the validity

.

,;

~
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Here the

of a patent when it is part of an antitrust scheme •

-

patent was the means by which ICI and Glaxo agred and the means
by which they imposed that agreement on their x±e licensees.
The district court found that the mere involvement of a

I

patent was not enough.

It limited the holding in Qy.I2fil:!ffiR

~

cases where the validity of the patent was an essential part of
the antitrust litigation.
correct in so ruling.

I tend to think that the court was

There is a good reason to keep the Justice

Dept from going into court challenging the decisions of the
Patent Office to grant patents.

And since every patent is a

restraint of trade, the g~ Justice Dept will be able to do that
unless the rule in Gypsum is limited.
The government's second contention is that the district

•

court should have g compelled the two defs to x±~exRx±ex license
or sell to anyone who wantee to EN~ buy the drug.

It claims

that the this is essential to effective relief because the
restrictions on the bulk sale of griseofulvin have rlulted in
~

very few companies that deal in the good in bulk.
licensing will remedy that market defect.

Only unlimited

The district court

is XXN said to have erred in ruling that the evidence did not

>mN show that compulsive licensing was required.

Re Apellees

point out, however, that the district court is generally given
a good deal of discretion in fashioning relief.
Appellees raise an independent claim about appellant's first
point, the validity of the patent.

•

They claim that the govt

has no right to challenge patent validity on direct appeal,
that the extraditing statute does not xakexR include patent
cases.

This seems to be wrong; surely the govt could appeal

the validity of a patent if it were, as is claimed here, an essential
part of its aRKXKN antitrust case.

.

..,,

'

.
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•

There seems to be little precedent in this area, and I
n

know so little about it that I do not trust my insticts fully .
~

But I am reasonably sure that the govt's second claim is not
worth considering.

The district court did not deny that it

had the power to order compulsory licensing ; it said that the
evidence did not mrxa warrant it .
XIMX«

I

and

Remedies are xegxx pretty

much XNNX left within the distA}t court's discretion,
a rev~ by this Court would require JraN2X wading through

the predictable innumerable documents .

As to the validity of

the patent question, I sense that appelles are right and that
the judgment below should be affirmed .
a firm recommendation.

•

~

•

You may well think that the issue is

worthy of argument •
AFFIRM ?

But I hesitate to make

F ox
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No. 71-666

-

•

Two British companies, owning patents on an antibiotic drug,
agreed with each other (i) to pool their patents and (ii) to prohibit
licensees from selling in bulk .

Each of the British companies then designated

licensees in the U.S. , under agreements prohibiting bulk sales .
In an antitrust suit by the government (tried w©

•

-

I':")

ut jury) the

L

D.C. hel Whe agreement violated Section 1 of Sherman Act, but refused to
consider validity of the patent (as requested by Government).

Normally

Govt. has no standing to challenge validity of a patent under antitrust
laws.

(Patents a re intended to create monopolies) , unless an antitrust

defendant invokes a patent as a defense.

U.S. v . United States Gypsum Co .

District Court construed Gypsum as applying only where validity of patent
is an essential part o f the antitrust litigation - which was not found to
e x ist here.
Govt. also says D.C. e~ ed in not compelling defendants to license
or sell to anyone who wish to buy the drug .
the power to order

D. C. recognized that it has

compulsory licensing, but concluded evidence in case

did not warrant it .
I~

•

V

'

no law requiring compulsory licensj.ng in the absence

of a factual showing that this is necessary to avoid restraint of trade.

_,
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•

•

•

Tentative View:

Affirm decision of D.C.

to know as much about the facts as D.C. did .

We are unlikely ever

._,.,{

Court

-
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~u:prtmt (qourt of tltt ~ittb .jtatts
JhtsJrin9hm. l9. <q. 20.;rJ.L.'
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

November 13, -1972

RE: NO. 71-666, U. S. v. GLAXO GROUP LTD.

Dear Chief,
This will confirm that I have asked
Bill Rehnquist to write the opinion for the Court
in this case.
Sincerely yours,

0~ .

\/

The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

/

-

j5u:p-umt (!Jou.rt of t4t 'Jjlttitdt j5tatts

Jfagfri:ttgton. ~. QJ.

2!l,5J!.~

CHAMBERS OF

I

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

November 22, 1972

Re: No. 71-666, United States v. Glaxo Group Limited et al.

Dear Bill,
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court
in this case.
Sincerely yours,

(/ s.)
' \· /

:41--

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

Copies to the Conference

"

/

.§u:p-umt (!Jltltrt of tqt ~niltb ;i;fattg

'1'aglrhtgton. J. QJ. 2llffe>l-.;l
-

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

November 24, 1972

Re: No. 71-666

-

U. S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd.

Dear Bill:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

It- ;J.
,..
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

cc:

The Conference

✓

-

<!Jcmrt of t4t ~nitth .$5tntt.a'Jlllas-Jr.n-0to~ lB, QJ. 21lffe>!-~

,ju.prtmt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR.

November 27, 1972

RE:No. 71-666 -UnitedStatesv. Glaxo
Group Ltd.
Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissent in the
above.
Sincerely,

1//\~ -J~
.
Mr. Justice Douglas
cc: The Conference

✓

~ - / ~ ~~d'VV' r~

-

~

j)u:pTtmt <qqurt qf tlft 'Jlttmtb ~tatts

--

:Was4i:ttghm. ~. <q. :!0-ffe'!-'

CHAMBERS OF"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

November 30, 1972

Re:

71-666 - U. S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd.

Dear Bill:
I voted tentatively at Conference to reverse
in this case largely due to the inadequacy of the remedy
fashioned by the District Court.

I do not intend to write

but will likely join one or both of the dissents in part.

Mr. Justi ce Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

·i
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~'j_ •...,_!!.

--

• • · • r . " P . ~ -· ,.

_

~~.,~•-------=----- •-----------------------

-

~u.prtmr ~01trt

Ltf

t4r ';tlnifdt §t,tks

1l}a.sirittgton, p. <!;. 205>i~
CHAMBERS OF

November 30, 1972

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 71-666 - U. S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd.

Dear Byron:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincere~~
1/

Mr. Justice White
cc:

Conference

T.M.

V

-

j5u:prtmt QJourt llf tlrt 'Jlinittb j5tattg
~ aglrittghm. ~- QJ. 2!TffeJ!.~

/

CHAMBERS OF

TH E CHIEF JUSTICE

December 7, 1972

Re:

No. 71-666 - U. S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd .

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

'\

/

It appears that the resolution of this case is undeJoing
som e evolution and t hat Mr. Justice Rehnquist' s proposed
opinion does not enlist a majority.

t1

I was in the "reverse" posture at Confererence and on
reflection Byron White's position comes nearest my view
of the case.
I therefore suggest that he put his hand to
a draft to see if he can get a Court.

Mards,

-

j;n.prnne ~o-nrt of tlre]Jnitth ,§taftg

~as~ingfo1t. :!).

<q.

2.0ffeJ!,J

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS

December 22, 1972

Dear Byron:
In No. 71-666 - United States v. Glaxo
Group Ltd., please join me in your opinion.

w. o.

Mr. Justice White

cc: Conference

D~

JV

I

December 27, 1972

Re: No. 71-666 United States v. Glaxo

Dear Byroo:

Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White

cc: The Conference

-

~upumt <.q:ourt o-f tqc ~ttitth ;§tnitg
1Jllasfringto-n. g). <.q. 20J,Jl- 2
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR.

December 27, 1972

RE: No. 71-666 - United States v. Glaxo
Group Limited et al.
Dear Byron:
I agree.
Sincerely,

/>z~l
Mr. Justice White _
cc: The Conference

/

-

~uµrcnu (!feud of tltt ~e~ ~ta±es
'nlail!pn gton, ~. Qf. 2n~,1,~
CHAMBERS OF'

January 3, 1973

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

Re:

No. 71-666 - U. S. v. Glaxo Group Ltd.

Dear Byron:
I am still with you.
sincere 1 y,

cy(__
T.M.

Mr. Justice White
cc:

Conference

✓

-

/

..§u:prtntt QJ~u.d ~f tlft 'Jlinittb ..§taftg

~rullfmgtm. 10. QJ. 2rrg;:J!.,
CH A MB E RS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

January 3, 1973

Re: No. 71-666 - U. S. v. G laxo Group Ltd.

Dear Byron:
Please join me.

~v~
Mr. Justice White
Gopie s to the Conference

:1,,:.
)

-

~lt}tTtmt

{qtmrl of tlf~ 'Jilttililt ~taftg

jhuiltmgbm. ~. <If. 21l.;i'!-~
CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

January 18, 1973

Re:

No. 71-666

-

United States v. Glaxo Group

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

;u..l
Mr. Justice Rehnqui st

Copies to the Conference

vi

-

.§u:p-umt C!fcurt cf tqt ~ttitth .itattg

~agqmgtcn:. ~.

~ 21Jb,.ll-~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

January 18, 1973

71-666 - U. S. v. Glaxo Group
Dear Bill,
Please add my name to your dissenting opinion in this case.
Sincerely yours,

,y

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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To : The
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

Chief Justice
Justice Douglas
Justice Brennan
Justice Stewart
J1.:.stice t:irshal l
:'~? Jl:stice Blackmun
~ - Justice Powell
Mr. J1;stice Rehnquist

From : White, J .
1st DRAFT

Circulated: lc:2. - ;,..1 - 7 Y

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Recircul ated:

No. 71-666
On Appeal from the United
States District Court for
the District of Columbia.
Glaxo Group Limited et al.
United States, Appellant,
V.

[January - , 1973]

MR. J u sTICE vVHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The United States appeals pursuant to § 2 of the
Expediting Act, 15 U. S. C. § 29, from portions of a
decision by the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia in a civil antitrust suit. We are
asked to decide whether the Government may challenge
the validity of patents involved in illegal restraints of
trade, when the defendants do not rely upon the patents
in defense of their conduct, and whether the District
Court erred in refusing certain relief requested by the
Government.
I
Appellees, Imperial Chemical Industries Liniited (ICI)
and Glaxo Group Limited ( Glaxo) , are British drug
companies engaged in the manufacture and sale of
griseofulvin. Griseofulvin is an antibiotic compound
which may be cut with inert ingredients and administered orally in the form of capsules or tablets to humans
or animals for the treatment of external fungus infections.
There is no substitute for dosage-form griseofulvin in
combating certain infections. Griseofulvin itself is unpatented and unpatentable. ICI owns various patents
on the dosage form of the drug.1 Glaxo owns various
1 Specifically at issue in the present litigation is U. S. Pat ent
No . 2,900,204, issued August 18, 1959. The patent embodies two
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patents on a method for manufacturing the drug in bulk
form. as "·ell as a patent on the finely ground, "microsize"
dosage form of the drug."
On April 26, 1960, ICI and Glaxo entered into a formal
agreement pooling their griseofulvin patents. At the
time of the execution of the agreement, ICI held patents
on the dosage form of the drug and Glaxo held bulkform manufacturing patents. Pursuant to the agreement, ICI acquired the right to manufacture bulk-form
griseofulvin under Glaxo's patents. to sell bulk-form
griseofulvin. and to sublicense under Glaxo's patents.
Glaxo ,rns authorized to manufacture dosage-form griseofulvin and to sublicense under ICI's patents. As part of
the agreement . ICI undertook "not to sell and to use its
best endeavors to prevent its subsidiaries and associates
from selling any griseofulvin in bulk to any independent
third party without Glaxo's express consent in ,Hiting."
Subsequent to the pooling of the griseofulvin patents,
ICI granted a sublicense to American Home Products
Corporation (AMHO). ICI's exclusive distributor in the
l7nited States. ICI agreed to sell bulk-form griseofulvin
to AMHO. A::\1HO ,ms authorized to process the bulk
form into dosage form and to sell the drug in that form.
With respect to bulk sales the agreement stated: "You
[AMHO] "·ill not, without first obtaining on [ICI's]
consent. resell. or redeliver in bulk supplies of griseofulvin." Glaxo had previously entered into similar sublicensing agreements \Yith t,rn United States companiesclnim,-(1) a method of curing lrnmun, or animal, of external fungu s
di,e:·1,e, b\' aclmi ni~tering '"an effecti\·e nmount of gri,eofuh-in" to
them intcrnnll>· nnd (2) a cnp,ule. tnblet. or pill contnining an
cffrcti,·c nmount of gri,eofuh·in.
"Specific,ilh· at i,,ue in thr pre,ent litigatiou ici U. S. Pntent
~o. 3.330.727, i~cued .Jul>· 11 . 1967 . This putent CO\'ers the impro,·ed
(fine!>· ground or "micro:,ize'') docagc form of grisrofuh·in. This
form hn" pro\'en more effrcti\'e nnd more m:uketablc thnn other
dosage form~ of the drug.
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Schering Corporation (Schering) and Johnson & Johnson (J & J). The agreements contained a covenant on
the part of the licensees "not to sell or to permit its
Affiliates to sell any griseofulvin in bulk to any independent third party ,Yithout Glaxo's express consent
in ,Hiting." 3
On March 4. 1968. the United States filed a civil
antitrust suit against ICI and Glaxo, pursuant to § 4 of
the Sherman Act, 15 U. S. C. § 4, to restrain alleged
violations of § 1 of the Act, 15 U. S. C. § 1. The Government charged that the restrictions on the sale and
resale of bulk-form griseofulvin. contained in the 1960
ICI-Glaxo agreement and the various sublicensing agreements. were unreasonable restraints of trade. The
Government also challenged the validity of ICI's dosageform patent.•
The District Court. citing this Court's decision in
United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365(1967). held that the bulk-sales restrictions contained in
the ICI-AMHO agreement \Yere per se violations of § 1
of the Sherman Act." 302 F. Supp. 1 (DC 1969 ) .
Because ICI had filed an affidavit disclaiming any desire
3 Although AI-I:\10. Schcring . and .T & J could ha1·e man ufa ctured
bulk-form grif:eofnh·in under GJ:-ixo's pntcnt ~, in prnctice they purchased the bulk fo rm of the drug from I CI and G111xo and themsch·es
performed t he procc,:scs to conYert the drug to dosage form.
4 Sec n. 1.
The Go,·crnmcnt contendrd t hnt the "method" portion
of the patent die! not disclo~c hmY to pr;icticc the im·ention in that
it foiled to spec if>· what is ;in "rffrrtiYe amount" of the drug. See
35 U . S. C. § 112. The Go,-crnment :11,o nrguccl that TCI's product
claims ,,·ere im·:1 1id brcnu,:c the do~ngc form which the>· coYcred
d id not spec if>· nu "effccti,·e nmount" of the drug. did not specif>·
the di,:ense,: 1Yhir h could be cured, and clnimed n pat ent monopoly
on·r a sub~tnnc-P long in the publir doma in. Sec 35 U. 8. C. §§ 100
and 101.
·• The rase was decided on the basis of ,-n rious motions concerning
the meri ts :md the relief. Tc.otimom· w:1s not rerciYcd ; the facts
were de1·eloped in affidnYits , exhibit s, and interrogatories accom-p:rnying the motions .
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to rely on its patent in defense of the antitrust claims
the District Court struck the claims of patent invalidity
from the Government 's complaint. ruling that the Government could not challenge ICI's patent when it \Vas
not relied upon as a defense to the antitrust claims. The
D istrict Court also denied the Government's motion to
amend its complaint to allege the invalidity of Glaxo's
patent on "microsize" griseofulvin.(;
Subsequently, in separate. unreported orders, the bulksales restrictions in the Glaxo-J & J , the Glaxo-Schering,
and the Glaxo-ICI agreements were found to be per se
violations of § 1. The Court enjoined future use of the
bulk-sales restrictions. but refused the Government's request to order mandatory. nondiscriminatory sales of the
bulk form of the drug and reasonable-royalty licensing
of the ICI and Glaxo patents as part of the relief. The
United States took a direct appeal under the Expediting
Act and we noted probable jurisdiction. 405 U. S. 914.

II
The major issue before us is whether the District Court
erred in ruling that the United States could challenge
the validity of a patent in the course of prosecuting an
antitrust action only when the patent is relied on as a
defense, which was not the case here.7 We agree with
the United States that this was an unduly narrow view
of the controlling cases.
"See n. 2. The Government had sought to challenge the patent
on the basis that t he patent purported to monopolize a product
long in the publi c domain , on the ba sis of prior disclosure, and on
t he basis of prior public use. See 35 U . S. C. §§ 100, 101 , 102 (a),
102 (b) .
7 The Dist ri ct Court erred in st riking the allegations of t he Government 's complaint dealing wit h t he patent validity issue :rnd in
refusing to permit t he GoYernment to amend its complaint with
respect to this issue. On remand, t he District Court should consider
t he va lidity of t he I CI dosage-form patent and the Glaxo mi crosize
patent.
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United States v. B ell Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 224
(1897) , acknowledged prior decisions permitting the
United States to sue to set aside a patent for fraud or
deceit asrnciatecl with its issuance, but held that the
federal courts should not entertain suits by the Government "to set aside a patent for an invention on the mere
ground of error in judgment on the part of the patent
officials," at least where the United States "has no
proprietary or pecuniary [interest] in the setting aside of
the patent; is not seeking to discharge its obligations
to the public . . . . " 167 U. S., at 265. Subsequently,
United States v . Gypsum Co., 333 U . S. 364 (1948), referred to Bell Telephone as holding that the United
States was "without standing to bring a suit in equity to
cancel a patent on the ground of invalidity," but went
on to declare that, to vindicate the public interest in
enjoining violations of the Sherman Act, the United
States is entitled to attack the validity of patents relied
upon to justify anticompetitive conduct otherwise violative of the law. The Court noted that, because of
the public interest in free competition, it had repeatedly
held that the private licensee-plaintiff in an antitrust
suit may attack the validity of the patent under which
he is licensed even though he has agreed not to do so
in his license. The authorities for this proposition were
Sola Electric Co. v. Jeff erson Electric Co., 317 U. S. 173
(1942); Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Mfg . Co., 329 U. S.
394 (1947); and MacGregor v. W estinghouse Co., 329
U. S. 402 (1947). The essence of those cases is best
revealed in Katzinger where the Court held that although
a patent licensee ( under the then controlling law) was
normally foreclosed from questioning the validity of a
patent he is privileged to use, the bar is removed when
he alleges conduct by the patentee that would be invalid
under the antitrust laws, absent the patent. The licensee
was free to challenge the patent in these circumstances
because "the federal courts must, in the public interest,
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keep the way open for the challenge of patents ,vhich
are utilized for price fixing .... " Katzinger and Gypsum,
,rnre much in the tradition of Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully,
144 U. S. 224, 234 (1892): "It is as important to the
public that competition should not be repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really valuable
invention should be protected in his monopoly ... ," a
view most recently echoed in Lear v. Adkins, 359 U. S.
653, 670 (1969).
,ve think that the principle of these cases is sufficient
authority for permitting the Government to raise and
litigate the validity of the ICI-Glaxo patents in this antitrust case. According to the allegations of the complaint,
appellees had issued licenses under their patents that
unreasonably restrained trade by prohibiting the licensee
from selling or reselling patented bulk-form griseofulvin
and had included in the pooling agreement a covenant
to impose such restrictions on licensees. These charges
were sustained, the court concluding that the covenant
and the patent license provisions were per se restraints
of trade in the griseofulvin product market.
The District Court was then faced with the Governm ent's atack on the pertinent patents as well as its
demand for mandatory sales and reasonable royalty
licensing, the latter being ,rnll established forms of relief
,Yhen necessary to an effective remedy, particularly where
patents have provided the leverage for or have contributed to the antitrust violation adjudicated. See for
example, Besser Mfg. Co. v. United States, 343 U. S.
444 (1952); United States v. United States Gypsum Co .,
340 U. S. 76 (1950); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U. S. 392 (1947); Hartford Empire Co. v.
United States, 323 U. S. 386 (1943). Appellees opposed mandatory sales and compulsory licensing. asserting that the Government ,rnuld "deny defendants an
essential ingredient of their rights under the patent
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system." and that there ,vas no warrant for "such a drastic
forfeiture of their rights." In this context, where the
court would necessarily be dealing ,vith the future enforceability of the patents we think it would have been
appropriate. if it appeared that the Government's claims
for further relief were substantial, for the court to have
eHtertained also the Government's challenge to the
validity of those patents.
In arriving at this conclusion, we do not recognize
unlimited authority in the Government to attack a patent
by basing an antitrust claim on the simple assertion
that the patent is invalid. Cf. ·wallace Process Equiprnent v. Machinery & Cheniical Corp., 382 U. S. 172
(1965). Kor do we invest the Attorney General with
a roving commission to question the validity of any
patent lurking in the background of an antitrust case.
But the district courts ha.ve jurisdiction to entertain and
decide antitrust suits brought by the Government and,
where a violation is found , to fashion effective relief.
This often involves a susbtantial question as to whether
it is neecssary to limit the bundle of rights normally
vested in the owner of a patent, which in itself can be
a complex and difficult issue. The litigation would
usually proceed on the assumption that valid patents are
involved, but if this basic assumption is itself challenged,
we perceive no good reason, either in terms of the patent
system or of judicial administration, for refusing to hear
and decide it.
7JL.
The question remains whether the Government's case
for additional relief was sufficient to provide the appropriate predicate for a consideration of its challenge to
the validity of these patents. For this purpose, as we
have said, its case need not be conclusive but only substantial enough to warrant the court undertaking ,vhat
could be a large inquiry. but one which could easily
obviate other questions of remedy if the patent is found
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invalid and which, if the patent is not invalidated, would
lend substance to a defendant's claim that a valid patent
should not be limited absent the necessity to provide
effective relief for 3,11 antitrust violation to which the
patent has contributed. Here, we think not only that
the United States presented a substantial case for additional relief but we are of the view that it was sufficiently
convincing that the District Court, wholly aside from
the question of patent validity, should have ruled favorably on the demand for mandatory sales and compulsory
licensing.

~

In the first place, it is clea.r from the evidence that
the ICI dosage-form patent, along with other ICI and
Glaxo patents gave the appellees the economic leverage
with which to insist upon and enforce the bulk-sales
restrictions imposed on the licensees. 8 Glaxo apparently
8 The Government argued in the District Court:
"'Ye submit that [United States v.] Gypsum [33,'3 U. S. 86-l (19-!8) J
should be understood more broadly to support challenge to any
patent used by antitrust defendants in furtheran ce of their illegal
program. The importance of the Imperial patent to the defendants'
scheme to violate the antitrust laws is plain. It was, according to
ICI's contentions, the reason for the patent pool agreement in the
first place; Glaxo's grant of rights to ICI was paid for with the
Imperial patent. Without the Imperial patent the defendants could
not maintain their monopoly in the United States over the drug,
for then anyone who could secure bulk from griseofulvin could
make it up into pills and sell them without a patent to stop him;
bulk from griseofulvin is, as ICI points out, unpatented. The
Imperial patent thus bolsters the effectiveness of the illegal restraint
on alienation ICI imposes on the resale of bulk form griseofulvin;
if a sma.!l drug company somehow manages to get the unpatented
bulk form drug despite ICI 's restraint on alienation designed to
prevent it or anyone else from doing so, the defendants may still
suppress the manufacture of the drug by threat of patent infringement suit. In this context, vindication of the public intcre~t in
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considered the bulk-sales restriction to be a prerequisiteto the granting of a sublicense, for it rejected a draft
of the ICI-AMHO agreement because, among other
things, it would have permitted AMHO to sell griseofulvin in bulk form. There are indications also that
Glaxo refused a sublicense to others than Schering and
J & J because of fears that the companies would sell
in bulk form or pressure Glaxo to allow such sales. The
source of the patent pooling agreement pursuant to which
such licenses were permitted and which contained the
bulk-sales restriction was simple: Glaxo needed the
ICI dosage-form patent to assure its licenses the right
to use the patent and sell in dosage form. Pooling permitted ICI to engage in bulk manufacture, and, in exchange, ICI imposed the bulk-sales restrictions upon its
licensees. There can be little question that the patents
involved here were intimately associated with and contributed to effectuating the conduct that the District
Court held to be a per se restraint of trade in griseofulvin.
Secondly, we think that ICI and Glaxo should have
been required to sell bulk-form griseofulvin on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and to grant patent
licenses at reasonable royalty rates to all bona fide applicants in order to "pry open to competition" the griseofulvin market which "has been closed by defendant's
competitjon in unpatent able goods is doubly important-for t here
is a double impediment to commerce-the patent and the conspir[lcy."
The Government, throughout its brief in this Court, emphasizes the
importance of the patents to the antitrust violation.
" In cases like this, the patents involved generally are of major
importance in furthering the allegedl y unlawful patent licensing
practices; they give the defendants the power which enables them
to impose the restraint of trade. This is the situation here. The
patents were essent ial to the appellees' scheme to violate the antitrust
laws."
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illegal restraints." International Salt Co., supra, 332
U. S., at 401.
The United States griseofulvin market consists of three
wholesalers, all licensees of appellees, that account for
100% of United States sales totaling approximately eight
million dollars. Glaxo and ICI have never sold in bulk
to others than the licensees and ha.ve prohibited
bulk sales and resales by the licensees. In practice, the
licensees have not manufactured griseofulvin under the
bulk-form patents. preferring instead to purchase in bulk
form from ICI and Glaxo. The licensees sell the drug
in dosage and microsize form to retail outlets at virtually
identical prices. The effect of appellees' refusal to sell
in bulk and prohibition on such sales by the licensees
has been that bulk griseofulvin has not been available
to any but appellees' three licensees and that these three
are the only sources of dosage-form griseofulvin in the
United States.
There is little reason to think that the appellees or
their licensees, now that the bulk sales restrictions have
been declared illegal, will begin selling in bulk. It is in
their economic self-interest to maintain control of the
bulk form of the drug in order to keep the dosage-form,
wholesale market competition -free. Bulk sales would
create new competition among wholesalers, by enabling
other companies to convert the bulk drug into dosage
and microsize forms and sell to retail outlets. and would
presumably lead to price reductions as the result of
normal competitive forces. There is, in fact, substantial
evidence in the record to the effect that other drug companies would not only have entered the market, had
they been able to make bulk purchases, but also would
have charged substantially lower wholesale prices for
the dosage and microsize forms of the drug. Only by
requiring the appellees to sell bulk-form griseofulvin on
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nondiscriminatory terms to all bona fide applicants will
the dosage-form, wholesale market become competitive.
Relief in the form of compulsory sales may not, however, alone insure a competitive market. Glaxo and
ICI could choose to discontinue bulk-form manufacturing or the sale of griseofulvin in bulk form. The patent
licensees might then begin to practice the bulk-form
manufacturing patents pursuant to the patent licenses
to fill their needs for the bulk drug. The licensees, of
course, a.re not parties to this action, and a. mandatorysales order would not affect them. They would not be
required to make the economically less advantageous
bulk sales. The bulk form of the drug would be controlled by the licensees, and the appellees, because they
would be required under the Government's proposed
relief to sell to all applicants only so long as they se11
to any United States purchasers, could easily avoid the
mandatory-sales requirement. Unless other American
firms are licensed to manufacture griseofulvin, competition in the United States market ,vill depend entirely
upon appellees' willingness to continue to supply their
present licensees with the bulk form of the drug.
This Court has repeatedly recognized that " [ t] he framing of decrees should take place in the district rather than
in appellate courts" and has generally followed the principle that district courts "are invested with large discretion to model their judgments to fit the exigencies of
the particular case." International Salt Co. v. United
States, supra, 332 U. S., at 400-401 ; accord, Ford Motor
Co. v. United Slates, 405 U. S. 562, 573. The Court has
not, hmvever, treated that po,rnr as one of discretion,
subject only to reversal for gross abuse, but has recognized "an obligation to intervene in this most significant
phase of the case" when necessary to assure that the
relief will be effective. United States v. United States
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Gypsum Co., supra, 340 U. S., at 89. Accordingly, we
have ordered affirmative relief which the District Court
has refused to implement. See, e. g., United States v.
United States Gypsum, supra. The purpose of relief in
an antitrust case is "so far as practicable, [to] cure the
ill effects of the illegal conduct, and assure the public
freedom from its continuance." United States v. United
States Gypsum Co ., supra, 340 U. S., at 88. Mandatory
selling on specified terms and compulsory patent licensing at reasonable charges are recognized antitrust remedies. See, e. g., Besser Mfg. Co . v. United States, 343
U.S. 444 (1952); International Salt Co. v. United States,
332 U. S. 392 (1947); Hartford Empire Co. v. United
States, 323 U. S. 386 (1943). The District Court
should have ordered those remedies in this case.

~

